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A CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL CONTROL
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON*
How is it that people manage to live side by side without incessant
"warre of every man against every man"?' Thomas Hobbes, who won
fame for posing this question, concluded that the legal system-the rules
and might of Leviathan-is the wellspring of social order. Most law pro-
fessors implicitly propagate this Hobbesian view, perhaps because it
lends significance to what they teach. Law-and-economics scholars have
been particularly prone to assert the centrality of legal doctrine. There is
an opposing intellectual tradition, however, that emphasizes that social
order can emerge without law. Its core theorists have been empirical
sociologists and anthropologists who study stateless societies. Within the
legal academy the law professors associated with the law-and-society
movement have been the prime skeptics of the importance of law.
2
A field study that I recently conducted in Shasta County, California,
provides an empirical perspective on the sources of social order. The
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pendently striven to educate me in the sociology of law. Cheryl Davey and Thomas Hagler
provided able research assistance. Financial support was received from the Stanford Legal
Research Fund, which was made possible by a bequest from the estate of Ira S. Lillick and
by gifts from Roderick E. Hills and Carla A. Hills and other friends of the Stanford Law
School. (This article is part of a forthcoming book to be published by the Harvard University
Press.)
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 98 (Oxford Univ. Press ed. 1909).
2 When using the term "law-and-society movement," I refer to scholars who are prone to
contribute to and read the Law & Society Review and to be active in the Law and Society
Association. Many of them have roots in the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, political
science, and history. Although most regard themselves as social scientists, they tend to be
relatively humanistic, and many reject the rational-actor model of human behavior that law-
and-economics scholars typically apply.
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study investigated how rural residents resolve disputes arising over dam-
age done by stray livestock.3 Much of the Shasta County evidence casts
doubt on the Hobbesian view. In areas of Shasta County that are legally
designated as "closed range," a victim of cattle trespass is legally entitled
to recover damages from the livestock owner on a strict-liability basis. In
"open-range" areas, by contrast, a victim of trespass across an unfenced
boundary has no rights to legal redress. I found that the rural residents of
Shasta County (and even the insurance adjusters who settle minor tres-
pass claims) pay almost no heed to these legal rules. The operative rule in
both open- and closed-range areas is an informal norm that the owner of
livestock is responsible for the conduct of his animals. Shasta County
residents rely mainly on self-help to enforce this norm.
In other domains of Shasta County life, however, the legal system
provides the supreme rules. Claimants who have suffered property dam-
age arising out of highway collisions between vehicles and livestock
routinely file claims with liability insurers; when they have suffered per-
sonal injuries, they hire attorneys who file complaints in court. Ranchers
who would never sue neighbors whose cattle trespassed would not hesi-
tate to sue to protect water rights.
When I sought to place my findings from Shasta County in theoretical
perspective, I found current theories of social control inadequate. This
article seeks to demonstrate those inadequacies. In Section I, I identify as
expansively as possible the components of the overall system of social
control. These components include not only the legal system and informal
norms but also instruments such as self-control, contracts, and non-
governmental organizations. Sections II-III invoke portions of the typol-
ogy of Section I to criticize, respectively, the current theories of scholars
in the law-and-economics and the law-and-society movements. (Because
these critiques are relatively freestanding, a hurried and narrowly focused
reader may be able to skip Section I.) The central point of Section II is
that law-and-economics has exaggerated the role that the legal system
plays in the overall system of social control. The central point of Section
III is that law-and-society scholars have been remiss in developing theo-
ries that explain the content of rules. To suggest the gains that might be
forthcoming if current theoretical gaps were filled, Section IV concludes
with a hypothesis of wealth-maximizing norms. This hypothesis offers an
explanation for why Shasta County norms, for example, both hold a
' A first installment of my findings is Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute
Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1986). My forthcoming
book will more fully describe what I found.
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rancher accountable for his livestock and forbid a victim of cattle trespass
from using the legal system.
I. THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL
A system of social control consists of rules of normatively appropriate
human behavior. These rules are enforced through sanctions, whose ad-
ministration is governed by other rules.4 To help describe alternative
systems of social control, I distinguish between two types of sanctions,
five controllers that administer sanctions and make rules, and five types of
rules. My taxonomy will honor, when possible, the current scholarly
vocabulary of social control. 5
A. Rewards and Punishments: The Sanctions Suitable to a Tripartite
Normative Classification of Human Actions
6
Systems of social control typically employ both rewards and punish-
ments-both carrots and sticks-to influence behavior.7 In administering
these positive and negative sanctions, enforcers usually apply rules that
divide the universe of human behavior into three categories: (1) good
behavior that is to be rewarded, (2) bad behavior that is to be punished,
and (3) ordinary behavior that warrants no response. Figure 1, which
illustrates a tripartite classification system of this sort, employs the stan-
dard sociological adjectives "prosocial" and "antisocial" to describe out-
of-the-ordinary behavior. Economists would use "goods" and, when
' See text at notes 28-34 infra.
5 Any taxonomy of course threatens too sharply to cleave scattered phenomena that are
not readily distinguished. On the perils of taxonomic approaches, see John Griffiths, The
Division of Labor in Social Control, in I Toward a General Theory of Social Control 37
(Donald Black ed. 1984). But language invariably overgeneralizes. That visible light lies in a
continuum from infrared to ultraviolet does not render the word "green" useless.
6 This section draws on ideas developed in Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 728-
33 (1973). See also Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit? 13 J.
Legal Stud. 57 (1984).
7 Rewards are goods, services, or obligations to which a person would assign a positive
monetary value; punishments are goods, services, or obligations that a person would pay to
be rid of. The distinction between punishments and rewards is well developed in behavioral
psychology, where the two are sometimes referred to as positive and negative reinforce-
ment, respectively. Since Durkheim, sociologists have distinguished between penal and
compensatory (restitutive) modes of social control. These are two different forms of punish-
ment. What sociologists sometimes call therapeutic social control I would identify as a
reward system; the person who seeks help from others is rewarded for recognizing and
trying to remedy his plight. On these and other sociological distinctions, see Donald Black,
The Behavior of Law 4-6 (1976).
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FiGuRE I .- A tripartite classification of human behavior
pressed, "bads" to describe these two extremes. People who act antiso-
cially are "deviants"; people who act prosocially are "surpassers."
If the members of a social group were to wish to move behavior in a
prosocial direction (upward in Figure 1), they conceivably could employ
fewer than three normative classifications. For example, they could use a
bifurcated system that dropped the ordinary-behavior category and that
thus looked like the one in Figure 2.8 Or they could employ only punish-
ments (rewards) as sanctions and have a bifurcated system consisting of
two categories, that is, ordinary and punished (rewarded) behavior.
Finally, one could imagine a social control system that placed all behav-
ior in the same normative category and that thus eliminated the need for
the establishment of substantive rules whose role was to trigger changes
in sanctions. For example, a society could establish an unachievable stan-
dard of perfect behavior for human conduct and levy penalties on all
behavior, with the penalties presumably growing in magnitude as the
deviation from perfection increased.
These unitary and bifurcated systems seem alien because in most social
contexts people employ tripartite normative systems that make use of
rewards, punishments, and no sanctions at all. Baseball fans, for ex-
ample, cheer a shortstop's fielding gems, boo his errors, and sit on their
hands when he handles a routine ground ball. Or suppose an automobile
were to stall, block traffic in one of the two northbound lanes of a con-
gested limited-access highway, and create a mile of backed-up vehicles.
Most drivers would probably perceive that another motorist who stopped
to direct traffic would be acting prosocially, that motorists who quietly
waited out the jam would be acting ordinarily, and that motorists who
leaned on their horns while they waited would be acting antisocially.
As both examples indicate, the rules used to evaluate human behavior
tend to be set so that the "ordinary" category encompasses most conduct
8 Homans has defined norms (I think incorrectly) as rules of this character: "[A] norm is a
statement specifying how one or more persons are expected to behave in given circum-
stances, when reward may be expected to follow conformity to the norm and punishment,
deviance from it." George C. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms 97 (rev. ed.
1974).
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FIGuRE 2.-A bifurcated classification of human behavior
that occurs. This approach has the advantage of reducing the costs of ad-
ministering sanctions: that which is most common requires no response.9
Because behavior that ordinarily occurs typically warrants no punish-
ment, the word "norm" is ordinarily used in English in a potentially
ambiguous way. "Norm" denotes both behavior that is normal and be-
havior that people should mimic to avoid being punished. These two
usages are potentially conflicting because almost everyone laments some
features of the status quo. That the word "norm" has been able to main-
tain these two usages is a linguistic clue that ordinary behavior is only
rarely regarded as antisocial behavior.
B. Sources of Rules and Sanctions: The Controllers Involved in
Creating Social Order
It is useful to distinguish between five controllers that may be sources
of both rules of behavior and sanctions that back up those rules. There are
first-party, second-party, and third-party controllers. An actor who im-
poses rules and sanctions on himself is exercising first-party control. 10 A
promisee-enforced executory contract is a system of second-party control
over the contingencies that the contract explicitly covers; the person
9 The prevalence of tripartite systems is a clue that rulemakers are attuned to an over-
arching goal of minimizing costs, including administrative costs. Compare text at note 114
infra (hypothesis of wealth-maximizing norms). A century ago some courts held that ordi-
nary behavior could not be tortious. See, for example, Titus v. Bradford, B. & K.R.R., 136
Pa. 618, 626, 20 A. 517, 518 (1890): "[Hlowever strongly they may be convinced that there is
a better or less dangerous way, no jury can be permitted to say that the usual and ordinary
way, commonly adopted by those in the same business, is a negligent way for which liability
shall be imposed." Today, compliance with custom is rarely an ironclad defense in a tort
case. See, for example, The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (businesses may lag in
adopting safety devices).
'o The more a self-control system arises from a person's own reason, as opposed to
external socialization, the more accurate the label "first party." Whatever the origin of self-
enforced moral systems, there is broad agreement that they can be an important source of
social control. See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior
128 (1978); Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation 7-8 (1976); John W. Thibaut &
Harold H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups 134-35 (1959); and James Q. Wilson,
The Rediscovery of Character: Private Virtue and Public Policy, Pub. Interest, 1985. No. 81,
at 3. Llewellyn thought that education, not law, was responsible for achieving the basic
order in a society. See Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 107-18 (1951). He thus empha-
sized the combined roles of the self-control and the informal control systems.
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acted on administers rewards and punishments depending on whether the
promisor adheres to the promised course of behavior. Third-party control
differs from second-party control in that the rules are ones to which the
actor never explicitly agreed, and the sanctions are administered by per-
sons not involved in the initial interaction. Third-party controllers can be
either nonhierarchically organized social forces; organizations (non-
governmental hierarchies that make and enforce rules); or governments
(state hierarchies).
1. Controllers' Rules: Of Law and Norms
I refer to the rules that emanate from first-party controllers as personal
ethics, those from second-party controllers as contracts, those from so-
cial forces as norms, those from organizations as organization rules, and
those from governments as law. 11 (Although I will have something to say
about all of these, I will emphasize law and norms, the rules whose
interaction I studied in Shasta County.)
Max Weber, surely one of the most impressive theorists of social con-
trol, applied a somewhat different taxonomy. Weber defined law as the
rules enforced by bureaucrats who specialize in social control activity.' 
2
Weber's approach strains ordinary language because it is insensitive to
the identity of the controller who has made or who is enforcing the rules.
For example, employees of debt-collection agencies are specialized bu-
reaucratic enforcers, but one ordinarily thinks of them as enforcers of
contracts, not of laws. Similarly, if the Catholic church were to use spe-
cialized bureaucrats to enforce announced church policy, one would ordi-
narily view this not as the legal system in action but as something else,
that is, what I call organization control. Following Donald Black, I there-
fore use "law" only to describe governmental social control. Drawing on
a definition of Frank Michelman's, I define a government as a hierarchical
organization that is widely regarded as having the legitimate authority to
inflict detriments on persons (within its geographically defined jurisdic-
tion) who have not necessarily voluntarily submitted themselves to its
authority. 13
" These definitions of law and norms correspond moderately well to current usage in
American sociology. For example, Donald Black defines "law" as governmental social
control. See Black, supra note 7, at 2. Sociologists are still struggling with how to define
"norms." See George C. Homans, The Human Group 121-25 (1950); and John F. Scott,
The Internalization of Norms 67-81 (1971). Some sociologists, particularly Continental
ones, use "norm" to denote what I mean by "rule."
12 Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 5 (Max Rheinstein ed. 1954). See also
Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber 28-31 (1983).
13 Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty"
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L. J. 1165, 1167 (1977).
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Ordinary human conduct will be referred to here as "primary behav-
ior." Social control activity (such as the administration of sanctions),
carried out in response to (or in anticipation of) primary behavior, will be
termed "secondary behavior."' 4 Rules govern secondary behavior as
well as primary behavior. An enforcer who improperly responds to an-
other's primary behavior may himself suffer punishments. Tertiary be-
havior is social control activity carried out in response to secondary be-
havior. This classification system could be extended tier by tier, in
principle to an infinite number of levels of social control.
These distinctions among different levels of behavior can contribute to
a better understanding of how to prove the existence of a rule. 15 A
guideline for human conduct is a rule only if the existence of the guideline
in fact influences the behavior either of those to whom it is addressed or of
those who detect others breaching the guideline. The best and always
sufficient evidence that a rule is operative is the routine (although not
necessarily inevitable) administration of sanctions, whether rewards or
punishments, on people detected breaking the rule.' 6 For example, the
best evidence of a primary rule against dishonesty is a pattern of second-
ary behavior: the regular punishment of people discovered to be dishon-
est.17 Conversely, the total absence of enforcement actions against de-
tected violators of a guideline is conclusive evidence that the guideline is
not a rule.
An operative punishment-triggering rule may be so effective that it is
never violated. There might then be no enforcement activity to observe to
prove the rule's existence. In these situations other, less reliable evidence
14 I borrow these adjectives from H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law 89-96 (1961)
(distinction between primary and secondary rules). My typology of rules differs from Hart's,
however, and I disagree with him on some issues. See note 33 infra.
15 Hart lucidly discusses how to prove the existence of rules in id. at 9-25. See also tmile
Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society 424-35 (George Simpson trans. 1933).
16 Compare Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
1095, 1097 (1986): "A norm exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals
usually act in a certain way, and are often punished when seen not to be acting in this way";
Homans, supra note 11, at 123: "A norm, then, is an idea in the minds of the members of a
group, an idea that can be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or
other men should do, ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances .... But
even this definition is too broad and must be limited further. A statement of the kind
described is a norm only if any departure of real behavior from the norm is followed by some
punishment." These definitions show how estimable scholars of social control have tended
to overemphasize the role of negative reinforcement and hence to slight the role of reward-
triggering norms. But see id. at 297.
17 Rewards can be used to create incentives for honesty. But if most people are honest
most of the time, punishing the dishonest is likely to be administratively cheaper. See text at
notes 7-9 supra.
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may prove the existence of a rule.' 8 For example, an observer may some-
times be justified in inferring primary rules from patterns of primary be-
havior. Thus an alien who visited England could infer, without observing
any enforcement activity, that there are rules that people should shake
hands with their right hands but drive on the left side of the road. Observ-
ing primary behavior is, however, a risky way of determining the rules
that govern primary behavior. False negatives and false positives are both
possible. A false negative is most likely when detection of acts of de-
viancy is extremely difficult, but there is nevertheless an operative pun-
ishment-triggering rule that is regularly enforced against the few discov-
ered deviants.19 For example, if the IRS were regularly to treat proven
income from tips as taxable income, then that would be an operative rule
even though few tips are in fact reported as income because IRS agents
are rarely able to prove who received tips. False positives are possible
because not all behavior is normatively constrained. That people regu-
larly sleep does not indicate that there is a rule that they should sleep.
Only the regular punishment of detected nonsleepers or the regular re-
warding of sleepers would provide ironclad evidence that rules govern the
primary activity of sleeping.
20
People often make aspirational statements about appropriate human
conduct. These statements appear in statutes, in rule books for games, in
association bylaws, in the adages of everyday speech, and so on. An
aspirational statement is evidence of an operative rule but evidence that is
rebutted when patterns of primary or secondary behavior flout the aspira-
tional statement. What people do should be taken as more significant than
what they say. For example, a criminal statute that prohibits unmarried
adults from fornicating is not a rule as that term is used here if detected
violators would not regularly be punished. Similarly, Polonius's adage,
"Neither a borrower, nor a lender be," ' 2 1 suggests a normatively appropri-
ate course of primary behavior, but patterns of both primary and second-
ary behavior show that it is not a rule in the United States today. Aspira-
tional statements are likely to provide the best evidence of rules only
when patterns of primary and secondary behavior are unknown. For ex-
'8 A pattern of enforcement is thus a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the
existence of a rule. But compare Scott, supra note 11, at 72 (defining norms solely as
patterns of sanctions).
'9 When the surpassing of a reward-triggering rule is regularly rewarded, by contrast, one
can more confidently predict that primary behavior rarely surpasses the rule; unlike de-
viants, surpassers typically have incentives to make their activities known.
20 Compare Weber, supra note 12, at 2-5 (comparing conventions-patterns of behavior
whose violation will result in significant disapproval from others-with customs-regular
patterns of behavior that lack this normative underpinning).
21 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1, sc. 3.
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ample, because little is known of ancient times, the Ten Commandments
and equivalent aspirational statements in the sacred texts of other cul-
tures are (weak) evidence of rules that prevailed in antiquity.
A rule can exist even though the people influenced by the rule are
unable to articulate the rule in an aspirational statement. Children can
learn to speak a language correctly without being able to recite any rules
of grammar. Adults who daily honor a complex set of norms that govern
dress would be startled if asked to lay out the main principles that con-
strain their choice of apparel. Rural residents of Shasta County had trou-
ble articulating the norms that governed how they shared the costs of
boundary fences. An observer of regular patterns of secondary (and per-
haps primary) behavior may nevertheless be able to identify the content
of unarticulated rules.
The existence of legal rules is usually easier to prove than is the exis-
tence of norms. Court dockets, police reports, and the like reveal law-
enforcement efforts, and a law library contains most of the relevant (if
often ambiguous) aspirational statements.
Norms are harder to verify because no particular individuals have spe-
cial authority to proclaim norms and because the enforcement of norms is
highly decentralized. After studying Shasta County I nevertheless be-
came willing to assert that rural residents there honor a norm that an
owner of livestock is responsible for the conduct of his animals.22 The fact
that many of the people I interviewed said that a good neighbor would
supervise his livestock was only weak evidence of the norm. That most of
them did mind their animals said only a little more. The best evidence that
this norm existed was that Shasta County residents regularly punished,
with gossip and ultimately with violent self-help, ranchers who failed to
control cattle.
2. Controllers' Sanctions: Of State Enforcement and Self-Help
The five controllers that provide rules of behavior-namely, the actor
himself, the person acted on, social forces, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and governments-also administer the rewards and punishments
that are essential to the operation of a system of social control. I refer to
the sanctions administered by these five controllers, respectively, as (1)
22 The content of this particular norm should gladden normative analysts who believe,
often for different reasons, that civil obligations should rest on principles of strict liability.
See, for example, Guido Calabresi & Jon Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 Yale L. J. 1055 (1972); and Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability 2 J.
Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
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TABLE 1
ELEMENTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Controller Rules Sanction Combined System
First-party control:
Actor Personal ethics Self-sanction Self-control
Second-party con-
trol: Person
acted on Express contracts Personal self-help Promisee-enforced
express contracts
Third-party control:
Social forces Norms Vicarious self-help Informal control
Organization Organization rules Organization Organization
enforcement control
Government Law State enforcement Legal system
self-sanctions, (2) personal self-help, (3) vicarious self-help, 23 (4) organi-
zation enforcement, and (5) state enforcement.
Table 1 summarizes the terms for the various controllers' rules and
sanctions and also supplies terms to describe a particular controller's
combined system. As the table indicates, "informal control" will be used
here to describe the system of control that arises out of the operation of
decentralized social forces. Thus "social control" will retain its conven-
tional usage in sociology to denote the global system that results from the
work of all five controllers.
The controller that makes a rule is commonly the controller that en-
forces it. This follows from the proposition that the best evidence of a rule
is a pattern of regular enforcement. Nevertheless, different controllers
can combine their efforts in countless ways to produce hybrid systems of
social control. In particular, one controller can consciously enforce an-
other controller's aspirational statements. Thus private citizens may be-
come vigilantes who use self-help to enforce substantive legal rules.24
Conversely, police officers may mostly apply norms and personal ethics,
not "the book," in their everyday work.25 When courts look to business
23 "Self-help" literally denotes a person's efforts to square his accounts with others. This
same compound word has also rather misleadingly been the traditional legal and sociological
label for sanctions administered by friends, relatives, gossips, vigilantes, and other
nonhierarchical third-party enforcers. Deferring to this tradition, I use "self-help" to denote
both methods of enforcement and employ the adjectives "personal" and "vicarious" to
distinguish the second-party and the third-party varieties.
24 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J.
Legal Stud. 1 (1975).
25 See Donald Black, The Manners and Customs of the Police 180-86 (1980).
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custom to flesh out incomplete express contracts, the state is enforcing
norms created by social forces.26 A person who has "internalized" a
social norm is by definition committed to self-enforcement of a rule of the
informal control system. An arbitrator who applies personal ethics in
making an award may ultimately rely on the state to enforce the award.
Feedback loops may help to harmonize the rules of different control-
lers. For example, one function of a contract may be to crystallize sub-
stantive entitlements that other sources conferred in uncrystallized form.
As another example, political forces may limit the deviation of law from
norms.
C. Five Types of Rules of Conduct
One last taxonomy will complete the dissection of the social control
system. I identify five types of rules of conduct that apply to distin-
guishable categories of human behavior. The five types of rules are (1)
substantive rules, (2) remedial rules, (3) procedural rules, (4) constitutive
rules, and (5) controller-selecting rules. 27 Although each of the five con-
trollers can make all five types of rules, I use only governmental and
informal rules-law and norms-as illustrations.
1. Substantive Rules. The core of a system of social control is its
substantive rules. These define what primary conduct, that is, conduct
unrelated to the making and enforcement of rules, is to be punished,
rewarded, or left alone.
2. Remedial Rules. The substantive rules that trigger the administra-
tion of sanctions indicate only whether a reward or a punishment is to be
dispensed when the trigger is tripped but say nothing about the nature and
magnitude of the sanction to be administered. A system of social control
therefore must include remedial rules that govern these questions. Reme-
dial rules constrain all enforcement activity whatever the type of rule
whose breach has triggered activity from enforcers.2 8
Remedial laws include the legal rules on remedies and other legal rules,
such as rules of self-defense, that are more traditionally viewed as part of
the substantive law.29 I discovered analogous remedial norms in Shasta
26 See Elizabeth Warren, Trade Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale
for an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 515 (1981).
27 Each of these types of rules can be subclassified into reward-triggering rules and
punishment-triggering rules. See Figure 1 and text at note 7 supra.
28 For example, remedial rules constrain tertiary behavior provoked by inappropriate
secondary behavior. Remedial rules also constrain enforcers' responses to breaches of
procedural, constitutive, and controller-selecting rules.
29 The right of self-defense, recognized in the common law of battery, is a remedial rule
because it is applied to evaluate the propriety of a threatened person's response to another's
prior (or anticipated) aggression.
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County. For example. a victim of a series of cattle trespasses is supposed
to exhaust less drastic self-help measures before resorting to violence
against the trespassing animals.3 °
3. Procedural Rules. Procedural rules govern how controllers are to
obtain and weigh information before deciding whether to administer sanc-
tions in particular instances. Codes of evidence and civil procedure con-
tain basic procedural laws. An example of a procedural norm would be an
informal rule on the quality of evidence that an aggrieved person must
have before being entitled to spread negative gossip about another's
wrongdoing.
4. Constitutive Rules. Constitutive rules govern the internal struc-
tures of controllers. In the legal system, for example, constitutive rules
determine the structure and interrelations of the various branches of gov-
ernment. The constitutive rules of the legal system are mostly govern-
mental in source but not invariably so. Current examples of operative
constitutive norms at the federal level are the practice of senatorial cour-
tesy and the unwritten rule that the votes of four of the nine members of
the Supreme Court are needed to grant a writ of certiorari.
Constitutive rules also help structure the informal system of social
control. For instance, constitutive norms may encourage members of a
group not to be loners but rather to entangle themselves in the sorts of
continuing relationships that help foster cooperative behavior.
The constitutive rules of organizations typically arise from a number of
sources. Statutes often constrain the governance structures that the pro-
moter of a new organization may use. Within these legal constraints the
promoter drafts documents, such as articles of incorporation, that estab-
lish a governance structure. Some of the basic provisions in these docu-
ments typically cannot be amended without the unanimous consent of
members. For example, each member of a homeowners association usu-
ally has the right to veto a proposed reallocation of votes or assess-
31ments. Constitutive rules of this nature are contractual rules because
each member expressly agrees to their content. Because unanimity is
hard to achieve, the governing documents of organizations commonly
authorize a supermajority of members, or perhaps even an elected board
of directors, to change some rules that bind all members. Rules adopted in
this fashion are organizational rules, not contracts, because dissenting
members are coerced. For example, if the board of directors of a
homeowners association were to approve a bylaw that governed when
30 Ellickson, supra note 3, at 676-79.
31 See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1519, 1532 (1982).
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and where the general membership would hold its meetings, that constitu-
tive rule should be viewed as an organizational rule, not as a contract
among the organization's members.32
5. Controller-selecting Rules. The crucial role of controller-
selecting rules-the fifth and last category of rules-has gone little
noticed.33 In a society replete with governments, private organizations,
social forces, contractual arrangements, and individuals potentially capa-
ble of self-control, there must be rules that decide, for each domain of
human activity, the division of social control labor among the various
controllers. Controller-selecting rules perform this function. They coordi-
nate, for example, the social control responsibilities of the visible sover-
eigns that make and enforce laws with the social control responsibilities of
the invisible sovereigns that make and enforce norms.
All five controllers can make controller-selecting rules. When some-
one's personal ethics tell him to ignore a loss inflicted by another, he has
selected the other party's self-control system as the sole source of social
control. An arbitration contract is a second-party device for selecting a
social control system. A controller-selecting norm in rural Shasta County
told rural residents to use norms and self-help to resolve cattle-trespass
disputes and not to refer those disputes to the legal system.
An example from academic life will illustrate the function of an organi-
zation's controller-selecting rules. Suppose a law student were arguably
to have plagiarized library sources during the preparation of a paper. The
law school's staff would apply controller-selecting rules to determine
where to find rules on what constitutes plagiarism and how plagiarists
should be punished. These controller-selecting rules might point to the
application of university standards and sanctions for plagiarism-an ex-
ample of the use of contractual and/or organizational controls. If the law
school relied entirely on a student's own individual conscience to control
plagiarism, it would be selecting the self-control system as the exclusive
controller. If the school publicized the case among the students, it would
be choosing the informal enforcement of norms as the system of social
control. Finally, if the copying violated a plagiarized author's legal rights
in intellectual property, the law school might conceivably allocate the
plagiarism dispute to the legal system for resolution.
Some analogies may help clarify the role of controller-selecting rules.
These rules are a bit like the system programs that computers use to
32 See id. at 1529-39.
" Hart suggested that operation of the legal system requires a variety of what he called
"secondary rules." Some that he identified are analogous to what I call constitutive and
controller-selecting rules. See Hart, supra note 14, at 74-76, 89-94, 97-107. Yet Hart oddly
asserted that only the legal system needs secondary rules. See id. at 113-14, 151.
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operate other programs. They are also like the choice-of-law and jurisdic-
tional rules that courts use to decide, respectively, which government's
law is to be applied and which government is to be responsible for impos-
ing sanctions. Controller-selecting rules, however, address questions
prior to the ones that choice-of-law and jurisdictional laws reach, that is,
not which government's rules and enforcement powers are to be tapped
but, rather, whether any government should have a say about the matter
at hand. To illustrate their role for a final time, one function of controller-
selecting rules is to demarcate the boundary of the shadow of the law.
34
If the controller-selecting rule of any controller disfavors the legal reso-
lution of a dispute, the dispute is unlikely to enter the legal system. For
example, if controller-selecting norms were to point away from govern-
mental involvement in settlement of a dispute, a party would be reluctant,
because of likely informal sanctions, to knock on the courthouse door..
Similarly, if controller-selecting laws were to deny the court jurisdiction
over the matter because, say, it was "nonjusticiable," then ajudge would
not let a knocking party in.
D. The Scope of a General Theory of Social Control
On the basis of independent variables describing a society, a general
theory of social control would predict the content of the society's rules,
whether they be substantive, remedial, procedural, or controller select-
ing.35 Because a society's operative rules are best revealed by the charac-
teristics of the events that regularly trigger enforcement activity, 36 the
general theory would thus predict which events would trigger sanctions,
what the sanctions would be, how controllers would gather information,
and which controller would administer sanctions in a given instance. To
put forth even a rudimentary theory an analyst would have to incorporate
theories of the behavior of the five controllers. In other words, a general
theory of social control requires subtheories of human nature, of market
transactions, of social interactions, of organizations, and of governments.
For starters a theorist thus needs a command of psychology, economics,
sociology, organization theory, and political science.
3 The source of the metaphor is Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L. J. 950 (1979). Because divorces
must be processed through the legal system, those authors had no occasion to observe that,
in some other contexts, controllers other than the state set and enforce the original entitle-
ments of bargainers.
35 Because the theory of social control is so little developed, in their beginning ventures
theorists would likely treat as exogenous independent variables the constitutive rules that
determine group boundaries and controller structures and would attempt to predict only the
content of the four remaining types of rules.
36 See text at notes 15-22 supra.
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No small challenge, this. My object in the balance of this paper is more
modest. To suggest the utility of the taxonomy just developed, I will
employ parts of it to highlight major shortcomings in mainstream law-and-
economics and law-and-society theories of social control.
II. BEYOND LEGAL CENTRALISM: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF
LAW-AND-ECONOMICS THEORY
Most law-and-economics scholars and other legal instrumentalists have
underappreciated the role that nonlegal systems play in achieving social
order.37 Their articles are full of law-centered discussions of disputes,
such as cattle trespass disputes between farmers and ranchers, whose
resolution is in fact largely beyond the influence of governmental rules.
There are, of course, notable exceptions. Law-and-economics stalwarts
such as Harold Demsetz and Richard Posner have understood that prop-
erty rights may evolve in primitive societies without the involvement of a
visible sovereign.38 Several economists have emphasized that promisees
can enforce express contracts without the help of the state. 39 Yet many
scholars who work in law and economics still seem to regard the state as
the dominant, perhaps even the exclusive, controller.
A. The Legal-Centralist Tradition
Economist Oliver Williamson has used the phrase "legal centralism" to
describe the belief that governments are the chief sources of rules and
enforcement efforts.' The quintessential legal centralist was of course
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes thought that in a society without a sovereign all
would be chaos. To quote some of Hobbes's best-known lines, without
Leviathan one would observe
continual feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short .... To this warre of every man against every man, this is
also consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong,
"7 This is hardly an original point. See, for example, Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction
and the Law, in The Rule of Law 171 (Robert Paul Wolff ed. 1971); and John Griffiths, Is
Law Important? 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 339 (1979).
" See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers
& Proc. 347, 350-53 (1967) (development of fur trade led Labrador Indians to establish
tradition of exclusive privileges to use hunting territories); and Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Justice, chs. 5-8 (1981) (economic analysis of order in primitive societies).
" See, for example, Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981); and Oliver E. Williamson,
Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 519
(1983). See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, I J. L.
Econ. & Org. 5 (1985).
o Williamson, supra note 39, at 520, 537.
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Justice and Injustice have no place. Where there is no common Power, there is no
Law; where no Law, no Injustice. ... It is consequent also to the same condition,
that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but only that
to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it.41
Hobbes apparently saw no possibility that some nonlegal system of social
control, such as the decentralized enforcement of norms, might bring
about at least a modicum of order even under conditions of anarchy. (The
term "anarchy" is used here in its root sense of a lack of government
rather than in its vulgar sense of a state of disorder. Only a legal centralist
would equate the two.)
The seminal works in law and economics hew to the Hobbesian tradi-
tion of legal centralism. Economist Ronald Coase's work is an interesting
example. Throughout his scholarly career, Coase has emphasized the
capacity of individuals to work out mutually advantageous arrangements
without the aid of a central coordinator. Yet in his famous article The
Problem of Social Cost, Coase fell into a line of analysis that was wholly
in the Hobbesian tradition. In analyzing the effect that changes in law
might have on human interactions, Coase implicitly assumed that govern-
ments have a monopoly on rule-making functions. In a representative
passage, Coase wrote, "It is always possible to modify by transactions on
the market the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such
market transactions are costless, such a rearrangement of rights will al-
ways take place if it would lead to an increase in the value of production"
(emphasis added). 42 Even in the parts of his article where he took transac-
tion costs into account, Coase failed to note that in some contexts rights
themselves might initially be delimited not by visible sovereigns but
rather through decentralized norm-making processes.
In another of the classic works in law and economics, Calabresi and
Melamed similarly regard "the state" as the sole source of social order:
The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is one we call the problem
of "entitlement." Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of
two or more people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to
favor. Absent such a decision, access to goods, services, and life itself will be
decided on the basis of "might makes right"-whoever is stronger or shrewder
will win. Hence the fundamental thing that the law does is to decide which of the
conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.
Having made its initial choice, society must enforce that choice. Simply setting
the entitlement does not avoid the problem of "might makes right"; a minimum of
"' Hobbes, supra note 1, at 97-98; see also id. at 110-13 (only a state can force parties to
abide by their covenants).
42 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1, 15 (1960).
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state intervention is always necessary. Our conventional notions make this easy
to comprehend with respect to private property. If Taney owns a cabbage patch
and Marshall, who is bigger, wants a cabbage, he will get it unless the state
intervenes.
4 3
Although they doubtless know better, in these passages Calabresi and
Melamed lapse into an extreme legal centralism that denies the possibility
that controllers other than "the state" can generate and enforce entit-
lements.44
Economists have hardly been alone in exaggerating the state's role in
making and enforcing rules of order. Max Weber and Roscoe Pound, for
example, have both authored passages that seemingly endorse the dubi-
ous propositions that the state has, and should have, a monopoly on the
use of violent force.4 5 As both those scholars recognized elsewhere in
their writings, operative rules in human societies in fact often authorize
forceful private responses to provocative conduct.
Perhaps because legal centralists overrate the role of law, they seem
unduly prone to assume that actors know and honor legal rules. Econo-
mists know that information is costly, and a growing number emphasize
that humans have cognitive limitations.' Yet in making assessments of
the instrumental value of alternative legal approaches, respected law-and-
economics scholars have assumed that drivers and pedestrians are fully
4' Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena-
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1090-91 (1972).
4 Calabresi and Melamed's assertion that anarchic entitlements are highly correlated
with a party's individual power is plausible for entitlements created through promisee-
enforced contracts. Norms, by contrast, are less likely to bestow rights in proportion to
individual might; many self-help enforcers can gang up on a mighty bully.
41 Weber regarded the state as the supreme instrument of social control: "[Tihe modern
state is a compulsory association which organizes domination. It has been successful in
seeking to monopolize the legitimate use of physical force as a means of domination within a
territory.... The right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals
only to the extent to which the state permits it." Max Weber, Essays in Sociology 78, 83 (H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. 1958). In reality, no state has been able to prevent other
controllers from using violence to enforce rules of behavior. See also Taylor, supra note 10,
at 4-5 (criticizing Weber's position). Pound's legal-centralist tendencies are revealed in the
following passage: "It is a general principle that one who is or believes he is injured or
deprived of what he is lawfully entitled to must apply to the state for help. Self help is in
conflict with the very idea of the social order. It subjects the weaker to risk of the arbitrary
will or mistaken belief of the stronger. Hence the law in general forbids it." 5 Roscoe Pound,
Jurisprudence § 142, at 351-52 (1959). But see id. at 349, 352, 356 (acknowledging legal
recognition of limited rights to exercise self-help). Compare Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State,
and Utopia 12-15, 26, 34-35, 88-89, 138-39 (1974) (even an ultraminimal state should
sharply limit self-help because of danger that punishment will be wrongly inflicted).
4 See, for example, George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ.
213 (1961); George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of
Cognitive Dissonance, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 (1982); and Herbert A. Simon, Reason in
Human Affairs 3-35, (1983).
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aware of the substance of personal-injury law; 47 that, when purchasing a
home appliance whose use may injure bystanders, consumers know
enough products-liability law to be able to assess the significance of a
manufacturer's warranty provision that disclaims liability to bystanders ;48
and that people who set fires fully understand the rules of causation that
courts apply when two fires, one natural and the other man-made, conjoin
and do damage. 4
B. Some Evidence That Refutes Legal Centralism
Much of the evidence I gathered in Shasta County refutes legal cen-
tralism.50 When adjoining landowners there decided how to split the costs
of boundary fences, they reached their solutions in almost total ignorance
of their substantive legal rights. Moreover, as already noted, when resolv-
ing cattle trespass disputes, virtually all rural residents applied a norm
that an animal owner is responsible for the behavior of his livestock, even
in situations where they knew that a cattleman would not be legally liable
for trespass damages. Although I found that governmental rules and pro-
cesses were often important in the resolution of disputes arising out of
highway collisions between vehicles and livestock, even in those situa-
tions most rural residents badly misperceived the applicable substantive
law. As I will now show, other empiricists have come up with analogous
findings.
I. Substantive Norms Often Supplant Substantive Laws
Law-and-society scholars have long known that in many contexts peo-
ple look primarily to norms, not to law, to determine substantive entitle-
ments. In a path-breaking study published in 1963, Stewart Macaulay
found that norms of fair dealing constrained the behavior of Wisconsin
business firms at least as much as did substantive legal rules.51 H. Laur-
7 A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 37-49 (1983).
48 George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale L. J. 1297,
1350 (1981).
49 Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of
Torts, 9 J. Legal Stud. 463, 471, 495 (1980).
'O See Ellickson, supra note 3; and my forthcoming book.
5' Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963). For additional discussion of Macaulay's findings, see text at notes
108-9 infra. Others have replicated Macaulay's general finding that norms and self-help are
mainly what bring civility to business relations. See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social
Change: The Semi-autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 719, 723-29 (1973) (study of "better" women's dress industry); Thomas M.
Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting,
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ence Ross's study of how insurance adjusters settled claims arising from
traffic accidents similarly found that the law in action differed substan-
tially from the law on the books. For example, Ross discovered that
adjusters applied rules of comparative negligence even in jurisdictions
where the formal law made contributory negligence a complete defense.52
Vilhelm Aubert investigated the effect of the Norwegian Housemaid
Law of 1948. 53 That statute limited a maid's working hours to a maximum
of ten hours per day, gave maids entitlements to holidays and overtime
pay, and imposed other labor standards on employers of housemaids.
Although the ceiling of ten hours per working day was violated in about
half the households studied and the overtime pay provisions in almost 90
percent, Aubert found that no lawsuits had been brought under this stat-
ute. within the first two years of its enactment. Aubert concluded that a
housemaid's basic mechanism for controlling employer abuse was a non-
legal one, namely, her power to exit the relationship by obtaining employ-
ment in another household. He concluded that the statute's effect had
been modest at most.
5 4
Ross and Littlefield, in a more recent study, found that a mass retailer
of household appliances in Denver was much more solicitous of com-
plaining customers than the law required.55 For example, the retailer
would often refund a buyer's money, no questions asked, when it was not
legally compelled to do so.
When Steven Cheung investigated the supply of bees for Washington
orchards, he found that orchard owners basically relied not on formal
contracts but on a custom that each of them should provide bees in
proportion to the number of fruit trees owned.56
John Phillip Reid has described how norms brought about order in a
virtually Hobbesian environment.5 7 In the mid-nineteenth century
thousands of pioneers took the Overland Trail from Missouri to the West.
13 J. Legal Stud. 265 (1984); and James J. White, Contract Law in Modern Commercial
Transactions, 22 Washburn L. J. 1 (1982) (contract law did not influence how chemical
companies allocated supply during shortages).
52 H. Laurence Ross, Settled out of Court 240-41, 275-76 (rev. ed. 1980).
53 Vilhelm Aubert, Some Social Functions of Legislation, 10 Acta Sociologica 98 (1967).
5 See also Note, Alterations Needed: A Study of the Disjunction between the Legal
Scheme and Chinatown Garment Workers, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 825 (1984) (garment workers do
not invoke rights conferred under labor-standards legislation).
55 H. Laurence Ross & Neil 0. Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem-solving Mechanism,
12 Law & Soc'y Rev. 199 (1978).
56 Steven N. S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation, 16 J. Law &
Econ. 11, 30 (1973).
57 John Phillip Reid, Law for the Elephant: Property and Social Behavior on the Overland
Trail 339-40 (1980).
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Particularly in the mid-1840s the situation on the trail was nearly anarchic;
the identity of the national sovereign of much of the territory was dis-
puted, and no sovereign had law-enforcement agents in the area. Accord-
ing to Reid, travelers on the Overland Trail nonetheless demonstrated a
strong respect for conventional norms of property. For example, travelers
who lacked vital goods typically felt constrained to buy, not to take, what
they needed from others.
Laboratory evidence also casts doubt on legal centralism.58 Hoffman
and Spitzer fortuitously discovered the importance of substantive norms
during their laboratory experiments on the dynamics of Coasean bargain-
ing. In an early experiment Hoffman and Spitzer endowed their labora-
tory-game players with unequal initial monetary entitlements. 59 The game
rules allowed the players to negotiate contracts that would increase their
joint monetary proceeds from the game. The contracts could include pro-
visions for side payments. Hoffman and Spitzer expected to observe only
Pareto-superior contracts, that is, ones under which no party to the con-
tract would come out monetarily worse off. In the two-person games,
most players (especially those who knew that they would play against
each other at least twice) were instead inclined to split equally the gross
proceeds from a game, even when an equal split was Pareto inferior for
one of them. Intrigued by this result, Hoffman and Spitzer conducted
another experiment that they concluded revealed that a set of informal
norms, what they called "Lockean ethics," helped govern when players
were prone to equalize the gross proceeds. 60 In short, Hoffman and Spit-
zer tried to be sovereigns but found that norms (or conceivably personal
ethics) often trumped their initial distributions of property rights.
2. The Pervasiveness of Self-Help Enforcement
Legal centralists regard governments as the chief enforcers of entitle-
ments. The taxonomy of social control systems in Table 1 identified four
other possibilities, namely, self-sanction, personal self-help, vicarious
self-help, and organization enforcement. As mentioned, I found that self-
" See, for example, Leonard Berkowitz & Nigel Walker, Law and Moral Judgments, 30
Sociometry 410 (1967) (actors' moral opinions are more strongly affected by the moral
judgments of their peers than they are by the contents of formal law).
" Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental
Tests, 25 J. Law & Econ. 73 (1982).
60 Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An
Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. Legal Stud.
259 (1985). But see Glenn W. Harrison & Michael McKee, Experimental Evaluation of the
Coase Theorem, 28 J. Law & Econ. 653 (1985) (attributing some of Hoffman and Spitzer's
original results to the small size of the social surplus that players would obtain when moving
to the joint maximum).
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help was rife in Shasta County. Ranchers who refused to mind their
cattle, or to bear a proper share of boundary-fence costs, or to contribute
labor to a controlled burn did so at the risk of suffering the sting of
negative gossip or some other gentle form of neighbor retaliation. Rural
residents were also eventually willing to resort to violent self-help against
the trespassing livestock of ranchers who were repeatedly unmindful.
Social scientists increasingly appreciate the importance of self-help.
For example, Albert Hirschmann has analyzed how people can use the
options of "exit," "voice," and "loyalty" to influence others around
them. 6' The game-theoretic strategy of "Tit-for-Tat," lucidly analyzed by
Robert Axelrod, is a self-help strategy for people in continuing relation-
ships.62
Sociologists have long been aware of the power of gossip and ostra-
cism. 63 Donald Black has recently gathered cross-cultural evidence that
violent self-help is also common. 64 Black asserts that much of what is
ordinarily classified as crime is in fact retaliatory action aimed at achiev-
ing social control. The law itself explicitly authorizes self-help in many
situations. Both tort and criminal law, for example, authorize a
threatened person to use reasonable force to repel an assailant.65 The
legal-centralist assertion that the state monopolizes the use of force is, to
put it bluntly, absurd.'
3. The Scantiness of Legal Knowledge
Ordinary people know little of the private substantive law that applies
to personal interactions.67 Motorists may possibly learn that the failure to
6' Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Or-
ganizations and States (1970).
62 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).
63 See Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in Black ed., supra note 5, at
271.
64 Donald Black, Crime as Social Control, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 34 (1983). An expanded
version appears in 2 Toward a General Theory of Social Control 1 (Donald Black ed. 1984).
See also, for example, Sally Engle Merry, Urban Danger: Life in a Neighborhood of Strang-
ers 178-86 (1981) (role of actual and threatened violent retaliation in multiethnic urban
neighborhood); and Suzann R. Thomas-Buckle & Leonard G. Buckle, Doing unto Others:
Disputes and Dispute Processing in an Urban American Neighborhood, in Neighborhood
Justice: Assessment of an Emerging Idea 78, 79 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feeley eds.
1982) ("In brief, what we found was reliance on self-help").
65 See, for example, Kent Greenawalt, Violence-Legal Justification and Moral Ap-
praisal, 32 Emory L. J. 437, 448-66 (1983) (criminal-law rules on self-help).
66 It is more accurate to view the state as a major concentration of the privileged use of
force, not as a monopolist thereof. See Taylor, supra note 10, at 4-5.
67 In some contexts a law may influence the behavior of people ignorant of it. For ex-
ample, if the tort liabilities of teenage drivers were increased without their knowledge, their
liability insurance rates might rise, and fewer teenagers might drive as a result.
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wear a seatbelt is a misdemeanor, but only personal-injury lawyers are
likely to know whether the tort law of their state makes an injured motor-
ist's failure to wear a seatbelt a defense in a civil action. First-year law
students may complain that what they are encountering is boring but
never that it is old hat.
Surveys of popular knowledge of law relevant to ordinary household
transactions, such as the leasing of housing or the purchase of consumer
goods, invariably show that respondents have scant working knowledge
of private law. For example, when interviewers asked some 300 Austin
households thirty yes-or-no questions about Texas civil law, "high-
income Anglos" answered correctly an average of nineteen out of thirty
and "low-income Mexicans" an average of thirteen out of thirty (a per-
formance worse than chance).68 Another survey revealed that a solid
majority of Texas therapy patients did not know that they were protected
by a legal privilege of nondisclosure, perhaps because "[flor 96% of the
patients the therapist's ethics, not the state of the law, provided assur-
ances of confidentiality." 69 In Vilhelm Aubert's aforementioned study of
the Norwegian Housemaid Law of 1948, housemaids and housewives
were asked if they were aware of nine specific clauses in the statute, two
of which it did not in fact contain. The respondents "recognized" the
two fictitious clauses somewhat more frequently than the seven real
ones 70
Highly educated specialists could be expected to have a somewhat
better grasp of the private-law rules that impinge on their professional
practices. Givelber, Bowers, and Blitch conducted a national survey of
nearly 3,000 therapists to measure knowledge of the California Supreme
Court's 1975 Tarasoff decision, which dealt with the tort duties of thera-
pists when patients utter threats against third parties. 7' They found that
although 96 percent of California therapists and 87 percent of therapists in
other states knew of the Tarasoff decision by name, the great majority
wrongly construed it as imposing an absolute duty to warn rather than a
duty to warn only when a warning would be the reasonable response
under the circumstances. Many of the therapists were (understandably)
68 Martha Williams & Jay Hall, Knowledge of the Law in Texas: Socioeconomic and
Ethnic Differences, 7 Law & Soc'y Rev. 99, 113 (1972). See also Note, Legal Knowledge of
Michigan Citizens, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1463 (1973) (questionnaire respondents did better on
criminal-law questions than on consumer-law questions).
69 Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examina-
tion of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 893, 925 (1982).
70 Aubert, supra note 53, at 101.
7' Daniel J. Givelber, William J. Bowers, & Caroly L. Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality:
An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 443 (1984).
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confused about whether a California Supreme Court decision could im-
pose duties on therapists in other states. Lest law professors be too quick
to gloat, they should ask themselves how well they would perform if
closely quizzed about their possible civil liabilities for photocopying
copyrighted works for inclusion in class materials.
4. The Infrequent Use of Attorneys to Resolve Disputes
A person ignorant of law can get help from an attorney. Yet even in the
allegedly litigious United States, individuals who have nonbusiness prob-
lems are highly unlikely to turn to attorneys either to amplify their legal
knowledge or to help pursue a claim. In Barbara Curran's nationwide
sample of adults, one-third had never used an attorney during their
lifetimes, and almost another third had used an attorney only once.7 2
What prompts someone to take the unusual step of consulting an attorney
in a nonbusiness context? Curran found that the most common impetus
was not an interpersonal dispute but rather property transfer, that is,
buying real estate or planning or settling an estate.73 A solid majority of
American adults apparently go through their lives without ever hiring an
attorney to help resolve an interpersonal dispute.7 4 One of Curran's other
survey results may help explain this finding. When asked to appraise the
statement, "Most lawyers charge more for their services than they are
worth," 68 percent of the respondents replied that they agreed with it. 75
The Civil Liability Research Project (CLRP) is the most ambitious
recent empirical study of dispute-resolution practices in the United
States. 76 The CLRP researchers have found that Americans are not reluc-
tant to submit claims for compensation to other parties who they perceive
have seriously wronged them. Of these claims, 68 percent result in some
72 Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report of a National
Survey 186-94 (1977).
73 Id. at 196. About half of nonbusiness visits to attorneys involve these transactions.
Marital matters are the third leading cause of the use of lawyers.
74 Survey data indicate that about 20 percent of American adults have been parties in civil
lawsuits (other than divorce cases). Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 4, 21 (1983). A study of an older, middle-class
suburb of New York City found that, during a twelve-month period, middle-class residents
initiated just one civil case against neighbors and social acquaintances (a suit by one youth to
recover a $400 debt owed by another). The suburb had a population of 18,000. M. P.
Baumgartner, Social Control in Suburbia, in Black ed., supra note 64, at 79, 91-93.
75 Curran, supra note 72, at 231.
76 See generally Special Issue on Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation, pt. 2, The Civil
Litigation Research Project, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 485 (1980-81).
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sort of compensation being paid to the claimant.77 Yet the CLRP data
indicate that, even when a claim for over $1,000 has been initially re-
jected, in only 10-20 percent of cases will a claimant employ an attorney
to help resolve the dispute.78 If personal injury and alimony disputes were
to be excluded from the sample, the frequency of attorney use would be
much lower still.
79
In short, most people know little private law and are not much bothered
by their ignorance. Their experience tells them that the basic rules that
govern ordinary interpersonal affairs are not in the law books anyway.
This reality need not dispirit scholars who are inclined to use economic
analysis to study social order. As law-and-economics scholars continue to
shed the legal-centralist tradition, they may well find that by applying
game theory, transaction-cost economics, and similar tools, they can de-
velop a more powerful positive explanation of the division of social con-
trol labor than scholars in other schools have yet been able to develop.
III. BEYOND EXOGENous NORMS: THE SHORTCOMINGS OF
LAW-AND-SOCIETY THEORY
In contrast to the law-and-economics scholars, law-and-society schol-
ars have long been aware that norms and self-help play important roles in
coordinating human affairs. Perhaps because their vision of reality is so
rich, however, sociologists and their allies have been handicapped be-
cause they do not agree on, and often do not show much interest in
developing, basic theoretical building blocks. 80 Anyone who widely reads
in both law-and-economics and law-and-society literature is bound to
come away feeling that economists, although often dismayingly blind to
realities, are clearer, more scientific, and more successful in building on
prior work. The late Arthur Leff, who read extensively in both, called
law-and-economics a desert and law-and-society a swamp."' Having
probed the causes of the aridity, I now inquire into the causes of the
swampiness.
77 Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 525, 537 (1980-81), corrected in Richard E. Miller,
Erratum, 17 Law & Soc'y Rev. 653 (1983).
78 Id. at 546.
79 Id. at 537.
80 See George C. Homans, Coming to My Senses: The Autobiography of a Sociologist
333-48 (1984). But compare Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures 21-22 (1973)
(anthropologist's warning of the dangers of the cross-cultural models); Arthur A. Leff, Law
And, 87 Yale L. J. 989 (1978) (law professor's doubts about the possibility of positivist
science).
8" Personal communication, January 1985, from Stan Wheeler, who told me that Leff
made this remark to him in a casual conversation.
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A. Sociological Theories of the Interaction of Law and Norms
1. Legal Peripheralism and Evidence That Refutes It
Some sociologists are extreme legal peripheralists who dismiss the legal
system as utterly uninfluential. Legal peripheralism dates back at least to
the Roman historian Tacitus, who is still quoted for having asked, "Quid
leges sine moribus?" ("What are laws without morals?") This view was
particularly popular a century ago, when the social Darwinist William
Graham Sumner was emphasizing the role that "folkways" played in
achieving social order.8 2
Extreme legal peripheralism is as untenable as is extreme legal cen-
tralism. Although law may often be overrated as an instrument of social
engineering, it is not invariably toothless. For example, after the Russian
Revolution the Communists who took over the state apparatus were even-
tually able to use law to alter (although hardly totally to transform) life in
Moslem central Asia.83 Similarly, most observers would agree that
changes in federal civil rights law during the 1950s and the 1960s helped to
undercut social traditions of racial segregation in the South.
Focused field studies of the effect of changes in private substantive law
also refute extreme legal peripheralism. I found that the adoption of
closed-range ordinances in Shasta County deterred some ranchers from
running their herds at large because they thought that the ordinances
would increase their liabilities to motorists who collided with their cattle.
Prior empirical studies have found, among other things, that the allocation
of legal property rights in the intertidal zone affects labor productivity in
the oyster industry, 84 that the structure of workers' compensation sys-
tems influences the frequency of workplace fatalities, 85 and that the con-
tent of medical malpractice law has an effect on how claims are settled.86
82 William G. Sumner, Folkways 55 (1906). More recent examples of legal peripheralism
include Robert Bierstedt, The Social Order 223-24 (3d ed. 1970); and Burton M. Leiser,
Custom, Law and Morality (1969).
83 Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary
Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929 (1974); Gregory J. Massell, Law as an Instru-
ment of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of Soviet Central Asia, 2
Law & Soc'y Rev. 179 (1968). Massell emphasized the failure of Soviet law to bring about
rapid revolutionary change but nevertheless identified some consequences of the legal inter-
vention.
84 Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P. Donnelley, Property Rights and Efficiency in the
Oyster Industry, 18 J. Law & Econ. 521 (1975).
85 James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and
Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. Legal Stud. 293 (1976).
86 Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement out of Court: The Disposition of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. Legal Stud. 345 (1983).
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The mainstream law-and-society position today seems to be the sensible
one that both law and norms can influence behavior.
87
2. Theories of the Division of Social Control Labor
Because law-and-society scholars have appreciated that informal con-
trols always supplement and often supplant the legal system, they have
concerned themselves with the interplay between the legal system and
less formal systems of social control. Donald Black's The Behavior of
Law is the most ambitious overarching attempt to identify formally the
variables that affect to what degree particular disputes fall within the
shadow of the law.8 8 John Griffiths and William Felstiner have also writ-
ten insightfully about the division of social control labor. 89 In a more
particular context, Stewart Macaulay, Ian Macneil, and others recognized
(before any law-and-economics scholars did) that the presence of a con-
tinuing relationship would vitally influence how the parties to a contract
would resolve their disputes. 9° Law-and-society scholars would be the
first to admit, however, that they are a long way from having a general
theory of social control.
B. Theories of the Content of Norms
A key shortcoming of the law-and-society school has been its failure to
develop a theory of the content of norms. 9 1 Why did the particular norms I
found in Shasta County emerge? Why do basic norms such as honesty,
87 See Black, supra note 7; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science
Perspective 68-69 (1975); Robert L. Kidder, Connecting Law and Society: An Introduction
to Research and Theory (1983); and Richard Lempert & Joseph Sanders, An Invitation to
Law and Social Science: Desert, Disputes, and Distribution (1986).
88 Black, supra note 7. Black has focused his work on the content of what I call controller-
selecting rules. He has been less interested in the content of substantive, remedial, pro-
cedural, and constitutive rules.
89 See Griffiths, supra notes 5, 37; William L. F. Felstiner, The Logic of Mediation, in
Black ed., supra note 5, at 251; see also William L. F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin
Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming .... 15
Law & Soc'y Rev. 631 (1980-81).
90 Macaulay, supra note 51; Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 691 (1974). The subsequent law-and-economics literature on self-enforced contracts
(see note 39 supra) shows how transaction-cost economics can sharpen law-and-society
insights.
9' See, for example, Homans, supra note 8, at 2 (in his major theoretical work, an eminent
sociologist explicitly disclaims interest in content of norms); and Scott, supra note 1I, at 9
(noting the tendency of sociologists to treat norms as independent variables). The most
impressive recent theoretical work on the content of norms is Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The
Emergence of Norms (1977). Her inspirations were game theory and philosophy, not
sociology.
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promise keeping, and reciprocity seem to emerge in most societies?92
Perhaps because they do not agree on a theory of human nature, 93 sociolo-
gists and other law-and-society scholars have tended to treat observed
norms as exogenous, not as dependent variables whose contents are to be
explained.
Before documenting the law-and-society scholars' relative disinterest
in the content of norms, I briefly review three theories of the substance of
informal rules. These three theories are all currently unfashionable with
most sociologists.
1. Functionalist Sociology and Anthropology
A supposedly outmoded theory that nevertheless stubbornly refuses to
die holds that the norms of a social group serve to promote the group's
survival and prosperity. A crude version of this functionalist theory ap-
peared a century ago in the work of the social Darwinists. 94 The theory
gained more academic respectability when less overtly political versions
were espoused by social anthropologists Malinowski and Radcliffe-
Brown in the 1920s and the 1930s95 and by leading sociologists such as
Merton and Parsons in the 1950s. 96 The writings of tmile Durkheim and
Eugen Ehrlich, two of the founders of the sociology of law, also exhibited
pronounced functionalist tendencies.9 7
In the conclusion of this paper I will put forward a hypothesis that
suggests that functionalists have been on the right track.98 There can be
92 Some ethnographers have reported finding cultures where honesty, for example, is not
highly prized. See, for example, Myrdene Anderson, Cultural Concatenation of Deceit and
Secrecy, in Deception: Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit 323 (Robert W.
Mitchell and Nicholas S. Thompson eds. 1986) (the Saami of Lapland often spread misinfor-
mation and reward entertaining deceivers).
9' Sociologists tend to reject as being too reductionist the rational-actor model that econo-
mists and their allies use. A succinct review of the criticisms of the rational-actor model is
Jack Hirschliefer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 53 (1985).
' The social Darwinists have no sympathizers today. See Richard Hofstadter, Social
Darwinism in American Thought (rev. ed. 1965); and Edward 0. Wilson, On Human Nature
208 (1978).
9' See, for example, Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926);
and Alfred R. Radcliffe-Brown, Taboo (1939). Homans has distinguished between these two
scholars' forms of functionalism. See note 99 infra.
96 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure 1-84 (rev. ed. 1957); Talcott
Parsons, The Social System (1951). See also Thibaut & Kelley, supra note 10, at 135-42
(1959).
' See Durkheim, supra note 15, at 49-229 (on the function of the division of labor); and
Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (W. Moll trans. 1936).
Ehrlich believed that law is relatively unimportant and that social forces tend to produce the
same norms in all human societies.
98 See text at note 114 infra.
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no doubt, however, that functionalists have tended to be guilty of at least
three types of analytic errors. First, functionalist thinking is apt to be
circular. The analyst conclusively assumes that the norms observed are
functional and resorts to loose theories of group morale building to ex-
plain brutal puberty rites and other bizarre practices. To escape charges
of ex post rationalization, a functionalist must be able to predict the social
control practices that would be observed in an as-yet-unexamined setting.
Second, and relatedly, functionalist sociologists and anthropologists
have rarely been rigorous about how one would judge whether a norm
was functional for a group. Some social practices may be beneficial to
some members of a group but harmful to others. When a society con-
scripts its young adults to fight its wars, they may resent being sacrificed
for the benefit of noncombatants. Economists have faced a similar ana-
lytic hurdle because one of their central terms, "efficiency," is potentially
as ambiguous as is "functionality." Economists have met this challenge
by developing and debating a variety of definitions of efficiency, for ex-
ample, the Pareto-superiority criterion, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, and
so on. Functionalists in the softer social sciences, by contrast, have been
less likely to confront this ambiguity in their theory.
Third, and again relatedly, early functionalists had a tendency to con-
sider a human group as a single organism whose "health" could be exam-
ined.99 It was then easy for them to surmise that Darwinian evolutionary
processes would help to favor the survival of socially adaptive norms. In
the following passage, libertarian philosopher Friedrich Hayek lapses into
this sort of analysis.
It is not only in his knowledge, but also in his aims and values, that man is the
creature of civilization: in the last resort, it is the relevance of these individual
wishes to the perpetuation of the group or the species that will determine whether
they will persist or change. It is, of course, a mistake to believe that we can draw
conclusions about what our values ought to be simply because we realize that they
are a product of evolution. But we cannot reasonably doubt that these values are
created and altered by the same evolutionary forces that have produced our
intelligence. All that we can know is that the ultimate decision about what is good
or bad will be made not by individual human wisdom, but by the decline of the
groups that have adhered to the "wrong" beliefs.1°°
99 Homans called this version "societal functionalism." He criticized this approach,
which he associated with Radcliffe-Brown, for ignoring that social phenomena grow out of
the behavior of individual actors. Homans was more approving of "individualistic func-
tionalism," which takes the individual as the basic unit of analysis. He identified Malinowski
as a member of the latter school. Homans, supra note 80, at 154-57. A good introduction to
the academic debate over functionalism is System, Change, and Conflict (Nicholas J. De-
merath & Richard A. Peterson eds. 1967).
1oo Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty 36 (Phoenix ed. 1978).
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Before nonlibertarian scholars dismiss these thoughts, they should be
aware that Lon Fuller and Thomas Schelling have harbored suspiciously
functionalist sentiments. 101
The difficulty with this sort of organic analysis is that evolutionary
processes, as most biologists understand them, select either genes or
individual organisms, not groups, for survival. 102 Assume, for example,
that honesty is a functional norm in the sense that, if all the members of a
group were consistently honest, they would each be better off than if each
were consistently dishonest. Would the Darwinian struggle favor the sur-
vival of groups of honest persons? Not necessarily. A dishonest person
living in an environment of honest people might especially prosper on
account of being surrounded by easy marks. The Darwinian process
would then tend to select dishonest people for survival. In short, to sup-
port a Panglossian scenario of group evolutionary progress, functionalists
could not rely simply on the biological theory of natural selection. They
instead had to develop theories to explain how social control systems
would evolve within groups to prevent successful invasions by deviants
who would subvert group welfare. The early functionalists never came
close to filling in this missing theoretical link.
2. Interest-Group Theories of Norms
A second sociological theory, one less upbeat than functionalism, holds
that members of powerful interest groups manipulate the content of
norms to serve their own selfish interests. Traditional Marxist analysts,
for example, see much of the normative baggage of a society as part of the
false consciousness that deludes and hence pacifies the underclasses.
Some neo-Marxist scholars, such as Isaac Balbus, and non-Marxist schol-
ars, such as Howard Becker, also seem to have interest-group concep-
tions of norms. 0 3 In the eyes of interest-group theorists, the traditional
use in English of male pronouns to describe hypothetical persons might be
seen as evidence of men's efforts to subjugate women. Rational-actor
theorists, by contrast, might view this same usage as a normatively neu-
tral linguistic convention that solves, as well as does any other, what
game theorists call a game of pure coordination."1
101 See Fuller, supra note 37; T. Schelling, supra note 10, at 124-33.
102 See, for example, Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene 8-12 (1976); Edward 0. Wilson,
Sociobiology 106-29 (1975).
103 See Isaac D. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative
Autonomy" of Law, I I Law & Soc'y Rev. 571 (1976); Howard S. Becker, Outsiders 15-18,
147-63 (1963).
104 These games are analyzed in Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 89-99
(1960); and in Ullmann-Margarlit, supra note 91, at 74-133.
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Interest-group theorists would win more converts if they could identify
the mechanisms through which well-placed interest groups might manipu-
late the norm-making process. One can readily understand how concen-
trated lobbies might be able to influence the legal system. The informal
control system, by contrast, is much more diffuse, and norms seem stub-
bornly resistant to deliberate influence. Totalitarian Communist regimes
have not been able to produce a "new man," Madison Avenue cannot
convince most motorists to buckle their seatbelts, and the right-to-life
movement seems to have had little success in stemming the incidence of
abortion. None of the various interest-group theories have yet offered a
plausible explanation of how interest groups control the content of norms.
A second shortcoming of the various interest-group theories is that they
are seriously incomplete. Many fundamental social norms appear neutral
in content. It is hard to see how common norms of honesty, reciprocity,
promise keeping, and respect for the bodily integrity of others serve the
interests of the strong at the expense of the weak. Some norms, such as
norms of charity, facially help people who lack power. Interest-group
analysts must amplify their theories so as to be able to explain distribu-
tively neutral and progressive norms.
3. Theories That Some Norms Are Genetically Hard Wired
Over the past decade a handful of scholars, located mostly if not en-
tirely outside sociology, have explored the possibility that certain core
substantive norms are hard wired in the genetic material that humans
carry. 1 05 The emergence of sociobiology-a discipline that seeks to recon-
cile the widespread phenomenon of cooperation among animals with the
Darwinian theory of evolution-has helped to stimulate this line of in-
quiry. 10 6 As the theorists of hard-wired norms readily admit, their work to
this point has been highly speculative.
A provocative article by Paul Rubin illustrates this type of scholar-
ship.10 7 Rubin hypothesized that evolutionary processes shape human
ethics and that tribes of hunter-gatherers had genetically influenced norms
that were adapted to their situation. The rapid transition to modern mass
society, Rubin speculated, has been too sudden for natural selection pro-
1o5 See George Edwin Pugh, The Biological Origin of Human Values (1977). See also
Charles J. Lumsden & Edward 0. Wilson, Promethean Fire: Reflections on the Origin of
Mind (1983); and A. Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions 160-64 (1981).
106 Wilson, supra note 102, is the seminal work. For criticism of the approach, see, for
example, Philip Kitcher, Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human Nature
(1985).
107 Paul H. Rubin, Evolved Ethics and Efficient Ethics, 3 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 161
(1982).
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cesses to have updated the relevant genes. A hunter-gatherer tribe might
be better off, for example, if it had a norm that required tribe members to
provide aid to the sick and impoverished because, in those societies,
undeserving shirkers could readily be detected. This same norm of char-
ity, suggested Rubin, might nonadaptively persist in anonymous mass
societies, where shirking is harder to detect. This sort of analysis has won
few converts, in part because (like functionalism) it seems to assume that
the evolutionary process selects survivors at the level of the group, not of
the individual.
4. The Usual Sociological Approach: Norms as Exogenous Givens
Most law-and-society scholars shy away from all theories of the content
of norms. For example, in his justly famous study of contractual relations
among Wisconsin business firms, Stewart Macaulay identified two princi-
pal norms that governed interfirm behavior: (1) "one ought to produce a
good product and stand behind it"; and (2) "commitments are to be
honored in almost all situations." 08 Essentially viewing people as rational
actors who try to maximize their net gains, ' 09 Macaulay seemed to regard
most of the behavior he observed as somehow adaptive. Yet Macaulay
offered no explanation for the emergence of the particular norms he ob-
served. Why had the business culture not generated norms of "caveat
emptor" and "there is no such thing as a binding commitment"?
Macaulay did not venture to say. He passed up his opportunity to offer a
theory of the content of norms and communicated only the (important)
message that controller-selecting norms can discourage actors from using
the legal system.
Similarly, in his enormously readable book The Human Group, sociolo-
gist George Homans identified "a norm that is one of the world's com-
monest: if a man does a favor for you, you must do a roughly equivalent
favor for him in return." 10 Homans drew on William Foote Whyte's
Street Corner Society" 1 to illustrate this norm of reciprocity. Whyte had
studied the Norton Street Gang, a group of young men of Italian descent
living in a Boston slum. The Nortons believed in mutual aid but also in
keeping accounts square: "In bad times as in good, if you have a few
extra dimes you are expected to give them to your friend when he asks for
them. You give them to him because he is your friend; at the same time
'o" Macaulay, supra note 51, at 63.
109 Id. at 66.
110 Homans, supra note 11, at 284.
... William F. Whyte, Street Comer Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum
(1943).
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the gift creates an obligation in him. He must help you when you need it,
and the balance of favors must be roughly equal. The felt obligation is
always present, and you will be rudely reminded of it if you fail to return a
favor." ' 2 Although Homans stands out among sociologists for his
clearheadedness, in the The Human Group and his other writings he
treats particular norms, even one of the worlds's most common, as exoge-
nous facts of life.
As these examples show, just as microeconomists tend to take consum-
ers' tastes as given and limit themselves to the study of market processes,
so sociologists tend to work not on what norms are but on how norms are
transmitted. 1 13
IV. CONCLUSION
Identification of the components of the overall system of social control
exposes gaps in current law-and-economics and law-and-society theory.
Economists are commendably interested in the content of legal rules but
tend to exaggerate the influence of these rules. Sociologists, who have
been more aware that social control springs from many sources, have
lagged in developing theories of the content of rules.
In my forthcoming book that grows out of my work in Shasta County, I
will immodestly attempt to build a bridge between the two schools. The
book will offer and explore a positive hypothesis of the content of norms:
that, in the absence of specific "social imperfections," the norms that
govern the relationships among members of a group will tend to maximize
the aggregate wealth of group members. (Examples of social imperfec-
tions are the lack of a prospect of a future relationship and poor informa-
tion about how group members behaved in the past.) This hypothesis of
wealth-maximizing norms crystallizes several older intellectual traditions.
It picks up the central idea of functionalist sociology and anthropology. It
is consistent with the law-and-society scholars' theme that a continuing
relationship is apt to civilize individual behavior. It suggests the sagacity
of Lon Fuller, Friedrich Hayek, and like scholars, who have kept alive
the Burkean notion that decentralized social forces contribute impor-
tantly to social order. The book will review the Shasta County evidence
112 Homans, supra note II, at 160.
113 At the atheoretical extreme in sociology is the interpretivist position (now arguably
dominant among anthropologists) that a particular culture just is what it is and, therefore,
that an analyst can do no better than to acquire a local knowledge of the symbolic meaning of
cultural practices. See, for example, Geertz, supra note 80, at 3-54 (1973). See generally
Leff, supra note 80; and Henry A. Walker & Bernard B. Cohen, Scope Statements: Impera-
tives for Evaluating Theory, 50 Am. Soc. Rev. 288 (1985) (cleavage within sociology be-
tween scientists and interpretivists).
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from which I induced this hypothesis and also investigate whether the
hypothesis is deducible from the branch of game theory that deals with
repeated games. I
For some readers the hypothesis of wealth-maximizing norms will con-
jure up Richard Posner's controversial hypothesis that the common law
evolves in a wealth-maximizing direction." 4 Because the judicial system
and nonhierarchical social forces may operate differently, however, the
validity of one of these hypotheses is not dependent on the validity of the
other.
Lest the hypothesis of wealth-maximizing norms be seen as a blanket
normative endorsement of using norms as rules, three sobering caveats
are immediately in order. First, wealth maximization is a goal with only
limited normative appeal. Second, social imperfections are common. The
hypothesis therefore does not predict that the norm-making process
would lead to the evolution of wealth-maximizing norms in a transient
social environment, such as a singles bar at O'Hare Airport. And third, as
norms of racial segregation in the Jim Crow era in the South plausibly
illustrate, norms that add to the wealth of one group's members may
impoverish, to a greater extent, outsiders to the group.
The hypothesis of wealth-maximizing norms has many normative and
positive implications. For example, if the substantive norms that arise
under perfect social conditions are indeed wealth maximizing in content,
then, when those conditions prevail, a utilitarian lawmaker would want
the law to incorporate social norms. The hypothesis thus suggests a nor-
mative underpinning for the law's use of business custom to flesh out
business contracts. It also suggests that controller-selecting norms tend to
allocate disputes among controllers so as to minimize a social group's sum
of administrative costs and opportunity costs arising from failures to
achieve cooperative outcomes. Thus, if Shasta County ranchers use
norms to resolve trespass disputes and use law to resolve water disputes,
the hypothesis suggests that this division of social control labor is one that
maximizes their aggregate wealth.
"" Posner concisely outlined his theory in Richard A. Posner, A Reply to Some Recent
Criticisms of the Efficiency Theory of the Common Law, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 775, 775-77
(1981). See also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3d ed. 1986). I am unper-
suaded by Posner's thesis, in part because many recent common-law decisions in the United
States have an overtly redistributive cast.
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